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BEYOND NIxom THE APPLICATION OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
TO THE PAPERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICEHOLDERS
The issue of ownership and control of federal governmental papers1
has come to the forefront in Nixon v. United States.2 In Nixon, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the governmen-
tal seizure of President Nixon's White House papers subsequent to the
Watergate scandal constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment.'
Therefore, President Nixon is constitutionally entitled to just compensa-
tion.4 Ultimately, the American taxpayer will foot the bill to compensate
President Nixon for this taking.5
The amount necessary to compensate President Nixon will be enor-
mous. The Watergate tapes alone are valued at approximately $2.5 mil-
lion.6 Moreover, experts have indicated that prices for a relatively
routine letter or memorandum from President Nixon's office range from
$500 to $5,000. 7
1. Congressional papers include all evidence of a documentary character which is under the
control and in the possession of Congress or an individual congressperson. Analogously, judicial
papers include all evidence of a documentary character which is under the control and in the posses-
sion of the federal courts or individual justices. David Kaye, Congressional Papers, Judicial Subpoe-
nas and the Constitution, 24 UCLA L. REv. 523, 524 n.8 (1977). Presidential papers are all
"documents, tape recordings, and other materials containing information and communications cov-
ering the official, political, and personal matters" of the executive office. Nixon v. United States, 978
F.2d 1269, 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
2. 978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
3. Id. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that former President Nixon
had a compensable property interest in his presidential papers and that the Presidential Records and
Materials Preservation Act, 93-526, § 1, Title I, §§ 101 to 106, 88 Stat. 1695-1698 (1974) (codified as
amended in notes to 44 U.S.C. § 2111 (1991)) [hereinafter PRMPA], severely restricted his property
rights to these presidential papers thereby constituting a per se taking of that property. Nixon, 978
F.2d at 1287.
4. Id.
5. Richard Nixon's Unjust Reward, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1992, at A26.
A Federal Court in Washington adds injury to insult by ruling that Richard M. Nixon is
entitled to payment for documents seized when he was forced from the White House....
The insult is that Mr. Nixon wins legal title to [the Watergate] documents.... The injury
is that U.S. taxpayers must pay for the documents that, by any fair view of the law, they
already own.
Id.
6. Ben Macintyre, Nixon Due Millions for Tapes, THE TIMES (London), Nov. 19, 1992, at
Overseas News Section.
7. See Nixon is Owed for Seized Watergate Tapes, Court Rules, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov.
18, 1992, at 7A. See also Robert Davis, Court: Nixon Deserves Pay for Papers, Tapes, U.S.A. TO-
DAY, Nov. 18, 1992, at IA.
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The Nixon case has also attracted the attention of the media. Newspa-
per articles and reports have raged across the country in resentment and
protest because of this new bill which taxpayers must add to their in-
creasingly large stack.' Less than two months after the Nixon decision,
the media again sparked public interest in the ownership and control of
governmental papers through its extensive coverage of Armstrong v.
Bush.' In Armstrong, the court considered whether the Bush Adminis-
tration could destroy certain computer records connected to the Iran-
Contra affair.' 0
Members of all three branches of the federal government have enjoyed
a long history of personal ownership of their papers, which rises to the
level of granting a property interest in those materials." The contro-
8. Individual taxpayers wrote to newspapers across the United States expressing their anger
over the Nixon decision. See, eg., Ruling on Nixon Papers, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 27, 1992, at B4
("legal yes, moral no"); Watergate Materials--Justice was Served over Nixon Documents but the
Decision Wasn't Just, SEATrLE TIMES, Nov. 25, 1992, at A7 ("If the decision of the court served
justice under existing law... [then] the law should be modified.").
In one such editorial, a taxpayer's disgust is especially evident as the author questions President
Nixon's willingness to compensate the United States for the "moral aftermath" of Watergate. See
History's Repeat Offender, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 24, 1992, at 10A. The author argues that
"Nixon was not like every president before him .... " "Victim's compensation is the real issue
here." Id.
9. Armstrong v. Bush, 810 F. Supp. 335 (D.D.C. 1993).
10. The court held that the Bush Administration could only erase White House and National
Security Computer files including E-Mail as long as identical electronic copies of the destroyed infor-
mation were preserved. Id. See also Stephen Labaton, Court Says Bush Administration Can Erase
Files if Copies Are Kept, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1993, § 1, at 8 ("Bush Administration could begin
erasing White House and National Security computer files as long as it preserved identical electronic
copies of the information it was destroying."); White House Ordered Not To Erase Discs, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 1993, at A25 ("The Courts and Congress have never said that the Federal Records
Act applies to only one Administration."); Saving Electronic History, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1993, at
A16 (observing that White House messages on electronic mail networks as well as other more sub-
stantive records produced on computer terminals are now part of the historical record).
The scandal surrounding the Bush White House files has continued into the Clinton administra-
tion. On May 21, 1993, a U.S. District Judge, Charles Richey, held the acting archivist, the Execu-
tive Office of the President, and the National Security Council in civil contempt for failing to
preserve computer tapes created during the Reagan and Bush administrations. George Lardner Jr.,
Administraiton Loses Ruling on Computer Tapes, WASH. POST, June 9, 1993, at A17. The Clinton
administration scheduled a hearing before the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals on June 15, 1993 and
asked Richey to stay his contempt order while the case is on appeal. Id. Judge Richey flatly refused
and stated that "a stay would be 'particularly inappropriate in this case' because the defendants
caused their own difficulties by transferring almost 6,000 tapes. . . from the White House, which was
equipped to make copies, to the Archives, which is not." Id. The presidential records in question
"include E-mail and logs containing information that Richey said 'historians and others need to
know about what essential people in the government knew and when they knew it."' Id.
11. See infra notes 33-78 and accompanying text. See also Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1277. ("History,
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CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICEHOLDERS
versy surrounding ownership of President Nixon's papers following the
Watergate scandal, however, called into question the wisdom of this long
history.
A few years after Watergate, Congress enacted the Presidential
Records Act of 1978,12 which was an act designed to regulate the papers
of the Chief Executive. This legislation attempted to avoid potential tak-
ings cases by Presidents in the future and complemented earlier legisla-
tion that regulated administrative agencies. 3 However, Congress has
not taken steps thus far to regulate itself or the federal courts regarding
congressional or judicial papers.
This Note contends that Congress should extend legislation governing
the papers of the President and administrative agencies to itself and to
the federal courts. Part I explores common law and historical traditions
of personal ownership of papers of the legislative, judicial and executive
branches. Part II reviews statutes that regulate the materials of the
Chief Executive and administrative agencies. Part III analyzes the
court's application of the takings clause to presidential papers in Nixon v.
United States and then applies the takings concept to the materials of the
congressional and judicial branches of the federal government. Part IV
concludes that Congress should enact prospective legislation to govern
the papers of the congressional and judicial branches in order to avoid
the real possibility of a valid takings claim by a perhaps scandalous con-
stitutional officeholder.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICEHOLDERS' PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THEIR
INDIVIDUAL PAPERS
A. General Property Rights and the Takings Clause
A private property owner possesses several important rights which in-
clude the ability to purchase, sell, lease, and bequeath. 4 Traditionally,
an owner's power to deny access to property is considered one of the
most treasured strands in the bundle of property rights.15 Although the
custom and usage indicate unequivocally that, prior to PRMPA, Presidents exercised complete do-
minion and control over their presidential papers.... [E]very president, or his heir or designated
representative, both before and immediately after President Nixon assumed control over his presi-
dential papers upon departing office.")
12. See infra notes 101-21.
13. The Federal Records Act. See infra notes 81-100 and accompanying text.
14. SHELDON F. KURTZ AND HERBERT HOVENCAMP, AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 3 (1987).
15. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
19931
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exact contours of the term "property" are not clearly defined, it is well
settled that the Constitution, while protecting property rights, is gener-
ally not a source of property interests itself. 6 Rather, property interests
"are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or under-
standings that stem from an independent source....",7
Common law recognizes that private property may be acquired
through a variety of independent means including the following: (1) de-
scent and purchase;"8 (2) authorship or creation;' 9 (3) unhindered posses-
sion and use as one's own;20 and (4) history, custom and usage.2
The Constitution plays an extremely important role in defining prop-
erty rights as well. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment22 pro-
vides that private property cannot be taken for public use23 without
paying the former owner just compensation.24 A compensable property
interest is not limited to real property, but also can apply to personal
16. Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1275.
17. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984) (quoting Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972))). See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901 (1992).
18. See Lynn v. Rainey, 400 P.2d 805, 811 (Oki. 1964) (observing that the law acknowledges
two means to lawful property acquisition: descent and purchase).
19. See American Tobacco v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299 (1907) ("[Tlhe property of the
author... in his intellectual creation is absolute until he voluntarily parts with the same.")
20. See Damon v. Secretary of H.E.W. 557 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[u]nhindered posses-
sion of an item, particularly when accompanied by use of the item as one's own .... ).
21. See Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1276 ("Property interests may... be created or reinforced through
uniform custom and practice."); Family Div. Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 707 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (observing that longstanding "norms and traditions" of the community themselves give
rise to property interests protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment); First Victoria
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 620 F.2d 1096, 1103 (1st Cir. 1980) ("[L]aw or custom may create
property rights where none were earlier thought to exist .... ).
22. U.S. CONsT. amend. V (". .. nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
23. Id. See also BARRETr ET AL., CONSTrTTIONAL LAW 592-93 (8th Ed. 1989) ("Judicial
scrutiny of the public use requirement has been limited.") See also Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midriff,
467 U.S. 229 (1984) (holding that the "public use" requirement is coterminous with the scope of a
state's police powers); Berman v. Parker 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (holding that a governmental taking of
a private commercial property located in an otherwise blighted area, and a transferring of such
property to a private redevelopment agency to build private housing as part of an area redevelop-
ment plan fulfills the public use requirement).
24. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
The historical rule that a permanent physical occupation of another's property is a taking
has more than tradition to commend it. Such an appropriation is perhaps the most serious
form of invasion of an owner's property interests.... [Tihe government does not simply
take a single "strand" from the "bundle" of property rights; it chops through the bundle,
taking a slice of every strand.
Id. (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)).
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property.25 Moreover, while no property owner's right is "absolute, 26
the Constitution requires compensation even where the taking is based
on a significant public interest27 or where it involves a de minimis physi-
cal occupation.28 Finally, when the government authorizes a physical oc-
cupation of property or actually takes title, the taking is considered a per
se violation of the Fifth Amendment requiring compensation.29
Of these common law and constitutional sources, perhaps history, cus-
tom and usage is the most prevalent in indicating presidential ownership
of White House papers.30 History, custom, and usage is equally preva-
lent in indicating personal ownership of the papers of other constitu-
tional officeholders. Historically, not only every President, but also every
Member of Congress and federal court judge possessed the right to gov-
ern the disposition of his or her own papers.31 The practical significance
of this tradition is grounded in principles of separation of powers.32
25. See Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1284. See also United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 62 n.9
(1989) (distinguishing between currency, which is not governed by the per se doctrine because it is
fungible, and "real or personal property").
26. See, eg., 35 U.S.C. §§ 181, 183 (1991) (governing patent applications subject to secrecy
orders in the interest of national security).
27. See 35 U.S.C. § 183 (1992) (providing for compensation if patent application is subject to
secrecy order); United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 685 (1896) ("The power of
Congress to take land devoted to one public use for another and a different public use upon making
just compensation can not be disputed.") (emphasis added).
28. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35 ("When the 'character of governmental action' is a permanent
physical occupation of property, [past] cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the
occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only
minimal economic impact on the owner.") (citations omitted).
29. Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1284 ("The rationale for the per se rule is that actual occupation of
property obviates an in-depth factual inquiry to determine whether one's economic interests have
been sufficiently damaged as to warrant compensation.").
30. Id. at 1269.
31. Patricia L. Spencer, Recent Case, I1 AKRON L. REv. 373, 376 (1977).
32. See Nixon v. Administrator, 433 U.S. 425, 441 n.5 (1977). President Madison in... re-
viewing the origin of the separation of powers doctrine, remarked that Montesquieu (the foremost
authority on the subject) "did not mean that [governmental branches] ought to have.., no control
over the acts of each other. [Rather, Montesquieu suggests] that where the whole power of one
department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department,
the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted." [Further, Justice Story determined
that although the] "separation of the three branches is indispensable to public liberty, we are to
understand this maxim in a limited sense. [The principle] is not meant to affirm that [the branches]
must be kept wholly and entirely separate and distinct, and have no common link of connection or
dependence, the one upon the other, in the slightest degree." (citations omitted). Id.
See also Trimble v. Johnston, 173 F.Supp. 651, 652 (D.D.C. 1959) ("At the foundation of the
Federal Government lies the doctrine of the separation of powers among three branches, the legisla-
tive, the executive and the judicial departments. With certain specific, express exceptions generally
Washington University Open Scholarship
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B. History of Presidential Papers
Of the three governmental branches, the history and tradition of presi-
dential ownership of White House papers is the most colorful and well-
documented. Every President before Nixon assumed control of his presi-
dential papers upon departing from office.33 The tradition began when
President George Washington removed his presidential papers to Mount
Vernon following his second term.34 President Washington's papers
were later sold to the government.35 In Folsom v. Marsh,36 Justice Story
found that the purchase of presidential materials by the government con-
firmed that until purchased, the papers were private property. 37
Presidents following Washington adopted his practice of treating presi-
dential papers as private property by devising them to their heirs.38 For
example, the papers of President James Madison descended to his wife
known as 'checks and balances', each of the three departments is independent of the others. As a
corollary, none of them may encroach on the powers of the other two.").
33. Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1277 n.20. The one significant exception to this practice was the "Map
Room Papers" which related to the conduct of World War II. Those documents and materials
remained in President Truman's White House following President Roosevelt's death due to the
highly unusual circumstances of the era. Id.
34. Id. at 1287-88.
President Washington's presidential materials are comprised of about 35,000 documents,
95% of which are currently stored in the Library of Congress. The President initially
removed his papers from the White House after his term of office and stored them in his
home in Mount Vernon, Virginia. He originally planned to build a permanent storage
facility for them, but before completing it, he passed away.
Id.
35. In his will, President Washington devised his presidential papers to his nephew, Justice
Bushrod Washington, to whom they passed upon his death. On Bushrod's death, most of Washing-
ton's presidential papers passed to Congressman George C. Washington, who, in 1834, sold the
majority of the papers to the U.S. for $25,000. Id.
36. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
37. Id. at 345. Justice Story found that Congress purchased the Washington materials at a high
price for the benefit of the country from their owner as private and valuable property. Thus, Justice
Story determined that "President Washington, therefore, intended them exclusively for public use, as
a donation to the public, or did not esteem them of value as his own private property, appears to me
to be a proposition completely disproved by the evidence." Id.
38. Appellant's Opening Brief at 24, Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(No. 92-5021). President John Adams' materials
remained in his family's archives for decades, until they were transferred to the Massachu-
setts Historical Society, where they long remained completely closed to the public. Presi-
dent Jefferson, though said to have forwarded papers relating to the business of the
executive branch departments to departmental files for retention by the government, took
with him his own personal presidential papers, including his presidential correspondence,
and this material ultimately passed to his heirs. Similarly, Presidents Madison and Monroe
willed their materials to their heirs.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Dolley upon his death in 1836. 9 In 1848, Mrs. Madison arranged to sell
all unpublished manuscript papers to the United States.g' Considerable
controversy resulted from this transaction because Mrs. Madison with-
held a significant portion of the President's materials and bequeathed
them to her son.41 Her son ultimately sold the papers to a third party
who, in turn, later sold them to the Library of Congress.4 2
Of the first thirty men to hold the presidential office, thirteen, includ-
ing Adams, Jefferson, Madison and Monroe, made specific bequests of
their papers. 43 Congress indicated its acceptance of the presidents' legiti-
mate property interest in their papers when it agreed to purchase the
materials from the heirs of at least three of these presidents.' In addi-
tion, numerous presidents have made gifts of their papers. Some Presi-
dents have made unreserved gifts of their presidential papers to the
Library of Congress.45 However, many of these "gifts" were accompa-
nied by strict instructions or conditions regarding the use and access of
the materials.46
Arrangements providing for conditional gifts to the Library of Con-
gress developed into the modern practice of exchanging presidential pa-
pers not only for conditions on use and access, but also for the care and
maintenance of a Presidential library.4 7 The first of these exchanges was
39. Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1288.
40. Id. The majority of President Madison's presidential papers were sold for $25,000.
41. Id. Mrs. Madison explained in a letter to the Secretary of State that she construed the
terms of the purchase to constitute only those papers written by the President himself. OFFICIAL
OPINIONS OF THE ATrORNEYS GENERAL 104-08 (C.C. Andrews ed. 1856) (Opinion of Attorney
General Caleb Cushing, April 14, 1855).
42. Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1288. Congress ultimately appropriated an additional $40,000 to com-
plete the purchase of President Madison's presidential papers. Appellant's Opening Brief at 24,
Nixon v. U.S.
43. Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1288-91. President Jefferson bequeathed his materials to his grandson.
Id. at 1288. President Madison bequeathed his papers to his wife Dolley. Id. See also supra notes
40-42 and accompanying text. President Monroe bequeathed his papers to his son-in-law. Nixon,
978 F.2d at 1289. President Tyler bequeathed his papers to his son and two sons-in-law for publica-
tion purposes. Id. at 1290. President Fillmore bequeathed the materials to his son. Id. at 1291.
44. Id. at 1282 (observing that Congress acknowledged the validity of these property disposi-
tions when it purchased presidential papers from the heirs of Jefferson, Madison and Monroe in
three separate transactions for a total of $65,000).
45. Appellant's Opening Brief at 24, Nixon v. United States.
46. Id. at 26-27. President Lincoln, for example, gave his papers to the Library only on the
condition that access to them be severely restricted. President Wilson's papers were obtained
through his wife, who made a gift, subject to the condition that the papers were held in trust for her
during her lifetime and would be accessible to others only with her authorization. Id.
47. Id. at 28.
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arranged by Franklin Roosevelt, who negotiated an arrangement with
Congress in which he gave his White House materials to the United
States on condition that the United States maintain them in a library to
be built on Roosevelt's estate in Hyde Park, New York.48 In proposing
his library plan to the Archivist of the United States, President Roosevelt
based his power to make the conditional arrangement on presidential
ownership of the materials.49
The Roosevelt tradition was continued by later Presidents subject to
the Presidential Libraries Act of 1955.50 Every President from Franklin
Roosevelt through Jimmy Carter, except for Richard Nixon, donated his
papers to the United States in exchange for a Presidential Library.5 The
48. Id. at 29. Representative Rayburn, a proponent of the deal in Congress, emphasized the
President's ownership of the materials:
These are the private property of Franklin D. Roosevelt, as papers of this sort have been
the private property of every President of the United States. He could sell them, of course,
for a fancy sum. They would be scattered to the four winds and no student who visited any
one part of the United States would ever have an opportunity to see them.
Id. at 30.
49. Id. at 29.
[The Archivist] wanted to know if the President's papers did not come within the class of
official papers. The President replied that following the precedent set up by Washington all
Presidents had regarded their Presidential files as their personal property and had always
taken them from the White House at the expiration of their terms of office. Pointing the
direction of the White House fileroom, he said: "When I came to the White House there
was not a scrap of paper in that room; when I retire, I shall not leave a scrap. The room
will be swept clean for my successor."
Id.
50. Presidential Libraries Act of 1955, Pub.L. No. 84-373, 69 Stat. 695 et seq. (1955) (codified
as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 2111-2112 (1991)). Under the Presidential Libraries Act of 1955, a
President may deposit any of his material with the Archivist of the United States and is free to set
restrictions on access to such material. Id.
[T]he aim of the Act was to encourage the donation ... of such materials by giving the
government increased flexibility to accept conditional donations or deposits, including gifts
conditioned ... on the maintenance of a presidential library in a facility chosen by the
President ....
In addition to empowering the government to accept donations of presidential materials
subject to any agreeable donor-imposed restrictions, the Act authorized the government to
accept donations of library facilities to house presidential documents.... Thus, the Act
reaffirmed the Roosevelt precedent and created a voluntary presidential library system pre-
mised on the President's ownership of their materials and their legal right to dispose of
those materials any way they wished.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 33-34, Nixon v. United States.
51. Id. at 28. Presidents from Roosevelt to Carter have
exercised their property rights by entering into voluntary negotiated agreements to donate
their materials in exchange for the United States' agreement to, inter alia: 1) provide the
substantial benefit of maintaining the materials at taxpayer expense in Presidential libraries
at sites selected for the personal convenience of the former Presidents (or their heirs); 2)
maintain broad restrictions upon public and even governmental access to the donated
materials as required by the former Presidents or their heirs; and 3) assure unlimited access
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/10
1993] CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICEHOLDERS
Presidents have used their ownership of the materials to drive hard bar-
gains, occasionally demanding personal museums as well as prestigious
libraries.52 Often Presidents have reserved the power to withhold por-
tions of their presidential materials.
53
Congress ratified each library agreement, apparently acknowledging
that without such deals, Presidents could freely dispose of their materials
as they desired.5 4 In hearings held before the passage of the Presidential
Libraries Act, Representative Joseph Martin argued in support of the
legislation indicating that as is the case with the papers of individual
Members of Congress,55 the papers of the President have always been
considered his personal property, both during his incumbency and
afterward. 6
Finally, Presidential ownership of White House papers is further sup-
ported by the numerous examples of Presidents intentionally destroying
their papers. Presidents Van Buren, Garfield, Grant, Pierce and Coo-
lidge are among those who destroyed significant numbers of their
to the original materials for the use and enjoyment of the former Presidents, their heirs,
and their designees.
Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 32 n.24.
The legislative history indicates that Congress was fully apprised of the tradition of presi-
dential ownership, and that the Act's provisions for voluntary donation rested on this foun-
dation. See, eg., Hearings on H.R. 7545, H.R. 8353, H.R. 8416, H.R. 8890, and H.R.
9129 Before the Executive and Legislative Reorganization Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Expenditures in the Executive Dept's, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 99-100 (1950) (testimony of
Dr. Wayne C. Grover, Archivist of the United States) ("[T]he papers - in fact all of the
papers - accumulated in the White House by our Presidents from George Washington to
President Herbert Hoover have been removed as personal papers .... It would be at the
discretion of the President whether or not he deposited the papers in the National Archives
at all. He could still remove his personal papers from the White House.") The legislative
history also makes clear that the power of the Administrator to accept papers with donor-
imposed restrictions was felt to be a necessary inducement to the Presidents to part with
their valuable property rights. S. REP. No. 2140, 81st Cong., Sess., reprinted in 1950 U.S.
C.C.A.N. 3547, 3564.
55. See infra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
56. See Hearings on H.J.Res. 330, 331, and H.J.Res. 332, Before the Executive and Legislative
Reorganization Subcomm., 84th Cong., Ist Sess. 12-13 (1955). Later, Representative McCormack
repeated this language verbatim in his personal statement for the record. Id. at 58-59. Other mem-
bers of Congress although not taking the matter up specifically, assumed presidential ownership as a
premise for the legislation. See, eg., id. at 23 (Representative Jonas asking whether it would not be
prudent to ensure that title to the documents pass to the United States upon dedication to each
Presidential Library so that future heirs of the Presidents might not remove the documents); id. at
26 (Representative Moss discussing the difficulties of acquiring title to the materials of already de-
ceased Presidents); cf. 84 CONG. REc. 6628 (June 5, 1939).
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papers.5 7
In summary, Presidents have tremendous power to dispose of their
papers as they see fit. This power has been strengthened by the acquies-
cence of both the Supreme Court 8 and Congress. 9
C. History of Individual Congressional and Judicial Papers
The tradition of congressional and judicial papers is not as colorful as
the papers of the Executive branch. Members of Congress and the judici-
ary, however, also retain their materials as private property.' This is
particularly true of Senate records. 6 Since the late eighteenth century,
Senators have regarded their congressional papers as their own private
property.62
Additionally, the right of access to congressional papers is quite lim-
ited.63 An individual wishing to search the records of the House of Rep-
resentatives for any period after 1789 must obtain permission from the
Clerk of the House to use even the oldest of these documents.' 4 Conse-
quently, there is no central depository for the materials of Senators and
Representatives.65
The absence of a constitutional or statutory right of public access to
congressional papers has also been expressed in case law. For example,
in Trimble v. Johnston ,66 a federal district court declined to require dis-
closure of Senate papers regarding various payroll accounts and funds
disbursements. 67 The court found that Congress must initially determine
57. Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1279. President Van Buren destroyed a large portion of his presidential
correspondence while he was still in office. Id. Similarly, President Garfield destroyed many of his
presidential materials in the two months between being shot by an assassin's bullet and his death in
1881. President Arthur apparently burned three large garbage cans filled with his papers. Id. Pres-
idents Grant, Pierce and Coolidge also had significant numbers of their papers destroyed. Id. at
1291-94.
58. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text.
60. See Arthur S. Miller and Henry B. Cox, On the Need For a National Commission on Docu-
mentary Access, 44 GaO. WASH. L. RaV. 213, 217 (1976).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Miller & Cox, supra note 60, at 217. The lack of a formal management procedure for
congressional records is completely at odds with the complex library system established for the
papers of the Executive branch. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
66. 173 F. Supp. 651, 652 (D.D.C. 1959).
67. Id.
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whether any congressional or governmental records are open for public
inspection.6" The court then concluded that because no constitutional or
congressionally created right of public access existed regarding unpub-
lished congressional records, no enforcement mechanism was available to
execute public information requests.
69
Like Presidents, Congressional members have donated important and
historically relevant materials to public or private educational facilities.7°
In litigation pertaining to one such donation, the court implicitly agreed
that Members of Congress own their congressional materials.71 These
congressional collections are often valued at significant sums.72
Federal judges, like Members of Congress and the President, have tra-
ditionally possessed their materials as private personal property.73 Judi-
cial ownership of Supreme Court and other federal judicial papers has
been congressionally and judicially ratified.74
Since the beginning of the Republic, the decision-making process of
the Supreme Court has been cloaked in a veil of secrecy.75 This secrecy
began when Chief Justice Marshall instituted the practice of Justices con-
ferring and arriving at decisions at secret meetings.76 These decisions
would subsequently be announced in open court.77 Justices today still
confer in total secrecy and retain all papers and notes as private
68. Id. at 654. Whether government records are open for inspection by the public is:
within the legislative power. If the Congress legislates to the effect that certain specified
records are to be open to the public .... and a person to whom this right is extended ... is
denied access to the records by their custodian, then ... at the behest of such [denied]
person, the courts may act and enforce the [statutory] right of inspection.
Id. See generally CHARLES R. MCCLURE, ET AL., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
POLICIES (1989).
69. Trimble, 173 F. Supp at 655.
70. See Morrison v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 71 T.C. 683 (1979), affd, 611 F.2d 98
(5th Cir. 1980). Congressman Morrison of Louisiana donated his collection of congressional papers
to Southeastern Louisiana University. This case concerned his ability to take a tax deduction for the
donation.
71. Id. The Tax Court considered whether the donated materials were a charitable deduction
for tax purposes. The Congressman was at all times presumed to own the materials outright. Id.
72. Id. For example, the estimated value of Congressman Morrison's materials was approxi-
mately $61,100. Id.
73. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
74. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 539.
75. Arthur S. Miller and D.S. Sastri, Secrecy and the Supreme Court: On the Need for Piercing
the Red Velour Curtain, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 799 (1973).
76. Id. at 808.
77. Id. Apparently, "Thomas Jefferson objected to Chief Justice Marshall's habit of 'caucusing
opinions' and 'his practice of making up opinions in secret and delivering them as the orders of the
court."' Id.
19931
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II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK GOVERNING PAPERS OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Congress has altered the historical private ownership of government
documents through two statutes: the Federal Records Act (FRA)79 and
the Presidential Records Act (PRA).80 Each of these acts gives the fed-
eral government ownership of government documents. There are several
differences, however, in how these statutes regulate the actions of govern-
ment officials.
A. The Federal Records Act
The FRA established a comprehensive management system for the
records of federal agencies."s The FRA governs not only the manage-
ment, but also the creation and disposal of these records., 2 In enacting
the FRA, Congress sought to ensure efficient and productive records
management, accurate and comprehensive documentation of policies and
transactions of the federal government, and judicious preservation and
disposal of federal records.83
78. Id. at 809.
79. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2901, 3101, 3301 (1991). The FRA is actually a series of separate
statutes.
80. See infra notes 101-14 and accompanying text.
81. The FRA defines "records" to include:
[A~ll books, papers, maps, photographs, machine readable materials, or other documentary
materials, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received by an agency of
the United States Government under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of
public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency... as evidence
of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities
of the Government or because of the informational value of the data in them.
44 U.S.C. § 3301 (1991).
82. Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The Freedom of Information Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988), also put restrictions on administrative agencies. However, this Note will not
discuss those restrictions.
83. 44 U.S.C § 2902 (1991). Section 2902 provides the purposes of chapters 21, 29, 31, and 33
of title 44:
Such records management standards and procedures shall implement the following
goals: (1) accurate and complete documentation of the policies and transactions of the
Federal Government. (2) Control of the quantity and quality of records produced by the
Federal Government. (3) Establishment and maintenance of mechanisms of control with
respect to records creation in order to prevent the creation of unnecessary records and with
respect to the effective and economical operations of an agency. (4) Simplification of the
activities, systems, and processes of records creation and of records maintenance and use.
(5) Judicious preservation and disposal of records (6) Direction of continuing attention on
records from their initial creation to their final disposition, with particular emphasis on the
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Section 2102 of the FRA provides for the independent establishment
of the National Archives and Records Administration.84 The Adminis-
tration is supervised and directed by the United States Archivist who is
appointed by the President. 5 The FRA provides that the Archivist must
give recordkeeping guidance to federal agencies by promulgating stan-
dards and guidelines dealing with records management.8 6 The FRA fur-
prevention of unnecessary Federal paperwork. (7) Establishment and maintenance of such
other systems or techniques as the Administrator or the Archivist considers necessary to
carry out the purposes of this chapter, and chapters 21, 31, and 33 of title 44.
44 U.S.C. § 2902 (1991). See also Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 287 ("[T]he statutory language and legis-
lative history of [the statute] indicate that one of the reasons that Congress mandated the creation
and preservation of federal and presidential records was to ensure that private researchers and his-
torians would have access to the documentary history of the federal government.")
84. 44 U.S.C. § 2102 (1991).
85. 44 U.S.C. § 2103 (1991). From 1934 to 1949, the National Archives was an independent
agency of government. However, between 1949 and 1984, the National Archives and Resources
Service (NARS) was located within the General Services Administration (GSA). The GSA Admin-
istrator appointed the Archivist. S. REP. No. 373, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3865. Historians and Archivists immediately questioned the wisdom of placing
NARS within GSA. "In 1963, Senator Mathias expressed strong reservations about 'the concept
that GSA should become the guardian of history as well as the custodian of washrooms, storerooms,
and workrooms.'" Id. at 6, 3870. Further, James Rhoads, who became Archivist in 1968, stated
that "eleven years ... at the helm of [NARS] thoroughly convinced me that independence from the
[GSA] was essential." Id. In the legislative history of the 1984 statute, the committee concluded
that NARS is fundamentally incompatible with GSA. Consequently, in 1984 Congress amended the
FRA to provide for the independent establishment of NARS and for the President to regain the duty
of appointing the Archivist. Id. at 22-23, 3886-87.
86. 44 U.S.C. § 2904 (1991). Section 2904 provides:
(a) The Archivist shall provide guidance and assistance to Federal agencies with respect to
ensuring adequate and proper documentation of the policies and transactions of the Fed-
eral Government and ensuring proper records disposition.
(b) The Administrator shall provide guidance and assistance to Federal agencies to ensure
economical and effective records management by such agencies.
(c) ... the Archivist ... shall have the responsibility-
(1) to promulgate standards, procedures, and guidelines with respect to records manage-
ment and the conduct of records management studies; (2) to conduct research with respect
to the improvement of records management practices and programs; (3) to collect and
disseminate information on training programs, technological developments, and other ac-
tivities relating to records management; (4) to establish such interagency committees and
boards as may be necessary to provide an exchange of information among federal agencies
with respect to records management; (5) to direct the continuing attention of agencies and
Congress on the need for adequate policies governing records management; (6) to conduct
records management studies and, in his discretion, designate the heads of executive agen-
cies to conduct records management studies with respect to establishing systems and tech-
niques designed to save time and effort in records management; (7) to conduct inspections
or surveys of the records and the records management programs and practices within and
between Federal agencies; (8) to report to the appropriate oversight and appropriations
committees of Congress and to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget in
January of each year and at other times as the Archivist... deems desirable .. "
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ther stipulates that the Archivist must report annually to Congress
regarding the agencies' recordkeeping policies and practices.8 7 Moreover,
the Archivist must notify Congress of any FRA violations."8
The Act requires each federal agency head to create and preserve
records containing appropriate documentation of the policies and proce-
dures of the particular governmental agency. 9 In addition, each agency
head must create and maintain an active, continuing program to further
economic and efficient management of agency records.90 Each agency
head must also establish safeguards against the removal or loss of records
he finds essential and compelled by Archivist's regulations.9'
87. 44 U.S.C. § 2106 (1991). Section 2106 provides:
The Archivist must submit to the Congress, in January of each year and at such other
times as the Archivist finds appropriate, a report concerning the administration of func-
tions of the Archivist, the Administration, the National Historical Publications and
Records Commission, and the National Archives Trust Fund. Such report must describe:
(1) program administration and expenditures of funds ... by the Administration, the Com-
mission, and the National Archives Trust Fund Board; (2) research projects and publica-
tions undertaken by Commission grantees, and by Trust Fund grantees, including detailed
information concerning the receipt and use of all.., funds; (3) by account, the moneys
[sic], securities, and other personal property received and held by the National Archives
Trust Fund Board, and of its operations, including a listing of the purposes for which funds
are transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration for expenditure to
other Federal agencies....
Id.
44 U.S.C. § 2904 (1991) provides for the general responsibilities for records management.
88. Section 2115 provides for the reporting and correction of violations:
(a) In carrying out their respective duties and responsibilities under chapters 21, 25, 29,
and 33 of [title 44], the Archivist and the Administrator may each obtain reports from any
Federal agency on the agency's activities under these chapters. (b) When either the Archi-
vist or the Administrator finds that a provision of any such chapter has been or is being
violated, the Archivist or the Administrator shall (1) inform in writing the head of the
agency concerned of the violation and make recommendations for its correction; and (2)
unless satisfactory corrective measures are inaugurated within a reasonable time, submit a
written report of the matter to the President and Congress.
Id.
44 U.S.C. § 2905 (1991) provides for the establishment of standards for selective retention of
records and security measures.
89. 44 U.S.C. § 3101 (1991).
90. 44 U.S.C. § 3102 (1991). Section 3102 establishes the management program. The program,
among other things, must provide for the following:
(1) effective controls over the creation and over the maintenance and use of records in the
conduct of current business; (2) cooperation with the Administrator of General Services
and the Archivist in applying standards, procedures, and techniques designed to improve
the management of records, promote the maintenance and security of records deemed ap-
propriate for preservation, and facilitate the segregation and disposal of records of tempo-
rary value...
Id.
91. 44 U.S.C. § 3105 (1991). By § 3105, officials and employees of the agency must know the
following:
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Finally, the FRA regulates the disposal of federal records.9 2 No
records may be destroyed or transferred except pursuant to the disposal
provisions of the FRA.93 The Archivist plays a key role in the disposal
process. 94 In 1984, the FRA was amended to further strengthen the Ar-
chivist's enforcement authority and obligations.9"
In Armstrong v. Bush,96 the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia considered the statutory framework of the FRA.97 The court
found that through the FRA, Congress intended to ensure that agencies
appropriately document their policies and decisions.9 The court also de-
termined that Congress intended that agencies develop records manage-
ment programs to "strike a 'balance between ... efficient and productive
records management and the substantive need for Federal records.' ",9
(1) that records in the custody of the agency are not to be alienated or destroyed except in
accordance with sections 3301-3314 of this title, and (2) the penalties provided by law for
the unlawful removal or destruction of records.
Id.
92. 44 U.S.C. § 3302 (1991) provides for regulations covering lists of records for disposal, pro-
cedure for disposal, and standards for reproduction.
44 U.S.C. § 3308 (1991) provides for disposal of similar records where prior disposal was author-
ized.
44 U.S.C. § 3309 (1991) provides for the preservation of claims by or against the Government
until such claims are settled.
44 U.S.C. § 3310 (1991) provides for disposal of records constituting a menace to health, life or
property.
44 U.S.C. § 3311 (1991) provides for destruction of records outside the continental United States
in time of war or when hostile action seems imminent.
93. 44 U.S.C. § 3314 (1991). See also supra note 82.
94. 44 U.S.C. § 3302 (1991). Section 3302 provides:
The Archivist shall promulgate regulations, not inconsistent with [Chapter 33], establish-
ing-l) procedures for the compiling and submitting to him of lists and schedules of
records proposed for disposal, 2) procedures for the disposal of records authorized for
disposal, and 3) standards for the reproduction of records by photographic or microphoto-
graphic processes with a view to the disposal of the original records.
Id. See also Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 285.
95. Id. at 292. The 1984 amendment was promulgated as a direct response to the Supreme
Court's decision in Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980). In
Kissinger, the Supreme Court held that the FRA does not contain an implied cause of action al-
lowing private parties to bring suit to recover records that have been unlawfully removed from an
agency. Recognizing that this created "the anomalous situation... whereby an agency head [had] a
duty to initiate action to recover records which he himself [had] removed" Congress amended the
FRA to require the Archivist to ask the Attorney General to sue and to notify Congress if the
agency head failed to make a similar request of the Attorney General. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 98-
1124, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. 28 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3865, 3894, 3903.
96. 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
97. Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 284. See also supra note 9.
98. Id. at 284-85.
99. Id. at 292.
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Accordingly, the court held that the FRA does not preclude judicial re-
view of agency guidelines, and in this respect, the FRA differs from the
Presidential Records Act.10°
B. The Presidential Records Act
The Presidential Records Act of 1978 (PRA)0'1 directs the President
to ensure that the activities, deliberations, decisions, and policies that re-
flect the performance of the President's constitutional, statutory, or other
official or ceremonial obligations are appropriately documented and that
such records are maintained as "presidential records."10 2 The PRA was
enacted in response to the Watergate scandal.10 3 This prospective' °4 leg-
islation, which became effective in 1981, terminated the long-standing
historical tradition of private ownership of presidential papers and hence
the reliance on presidential volunteerism for the government to acquire
control.105 The Act establishes the public ownership of records created
by presidents and their staffs. 106 The PRA also establishes procedures
governing preservation and public access to these records at the end of a
presidential administration. 107
The Archivist has important obligations under the PRA. The Archi-
vist's primary responsibility involves placing White House records in a
100. Id. The FRA differs significantly from the PRA in several respects and therefore does not
preclude judicial review whereas the PRA does. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
101. The PRA is divided into two titles: Title 1, 44 U.S.C. § 2111 (1991) and Title 11, 44 U.S.C.
§§ 3315-24 (1991). Title II establishes the National Commission of Records and Documents of
Federal Officials. The scope of this Note is limited to Title I.
102. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5732.
"In order for documentary materials involving the political activities of the President or his staff to
be considered 'Presidential records' the activities in question must relate to or have a 'direct' effect
upon the carrying out of the official or ceremonial duties of the President." Id.
103. Id. at 5736. "Although the [PRMPA, passed in 1974, see infra notes 133-38 and accompa-
nying text,] concerned itself only with the presidential materials of the Nixon Administration, the
Court's decision upholding the act nonetheless established principles that [governed the 1978 legisla-
tion] dealing more broadly with control of and access to Presidential papers." Id.
104. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 102 at 5732-33. The legislation became effective for
records created or received during President Reagan's first term which began January 20, 1981. Id.
105. Id. By revoking the tradition of private ownership of presidential papers, "the preservation
of the historical record of future Presidencies would be assured and public access to the materials
would be consistent under standards fixed in law. The primary function of presidential libraries
remains unchanged. The libraries are to continue to provide information about their holdings and to
make records available to researchers upon request on an impartial basis." Id.
106. Id. at 5733.
107. Id. See also 44 U.S.C. § 2202 (1991).
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presidential library or other federally operated facility. 08 The Archivist
must consider that the outgoing President may opt to place mandatory
restrictions of up to twelve years on availability to the public of certain
kinds of information. ' Although presidential materials are closed to the
public during the term of such a restriction, the materials are accessible
to the incumbent President or Congress when necessary. 10 The materi-
als are also accessible under demand of subpoena or other judicial
processes. 1I
Congress gave significantly more deference in the implementation of
recordkeeping practices to the President under the PRA than to federal
agencies under the FRA. This heightened deference is necessary to bal-
ance Congress' two competing goals: (1) to establish public ownership of
presidential records and ensure the preservation of those records;112 and,
(2) to recognize the separation of powers limitations on legislation regu-
lating the President's daily operations. 113 Congress balanced these com-
peting goals by requiring the President to maintain records documenting
the policies and activities of his or her administration, but by leaving the
implementation of this requirement in the President's hands.114
During his term of office, the President may dispose of any presidential
108. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 102, at 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5735.
The Archivist [is] given up to five years from the end of a President's tenure in office to
complete archival processing of the records. During this period the Archivist [is] under no
legal compulsion to make documents available to the general public. Once processed, the
Archivist's determinations whether particular documents [fall] within a mandatory restric-
tion imposed by the former President are not subject to judicial review during the term of
the restriction. The Archivist[, however, is] required to establish an administrative appeal
procedure which... require[s] a written determination within 30 working days on whether
access to a record was properly denied on the grounds that it came within a mandatory
restriction.
Id.
109. 44 U.S.C. § 2204 (1991).
110. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 102, at 5, reprinted in, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5735.
111. Id. Accessibility is "subject to any rights, defenses or privileges that a former or sitting
President or others might assert .... " Id.
112. Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 290.
113. Id.
114. 44 U.S.C. § 2203 (1991). Section 2203 governs the management and custody of presidential
records. § 2203(a) provides:
Through the implementation of records management controls and other necessary actions,
the President shall take all such steps as may be necessary to assure that the activities,
deliberations, decisions, and policies that reflect the performance of his constitutional, stat-
utory, or other official or ceremonial duties are adequately documented and that such
records are maintained as Presidential records pursuant to the requirements of this section
and other provisions of law.
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materials that no longer possess administrative, historical, or evidentiary
value.115 The Archivist may notify Congress of any intent the President
has to dispose of the records. 1 6 If the Archivist chooses to inform Con-
gress, the President must wait sixty days after presenting disposal sched-
ules to the appropriate congressional committees before destroying the
records.' 17 However, the PRA grants neither the Archivist nor Congress
authority to veto the President's decision to destroy the records." 8
Therefore, the PRA allows the President nearly absolute control over
presidential materials during his term of office. 9
Upon the conclusion of the President's term of office, the Archivist
takes control of the presidential records and different disposal provisions
apply. 2 ' After giving notice in the Federal Register, the Archivist may
dispose of records that have inadequate value to warrant their continued
preservation. 121
C. Differences Between the FRA and the PRA
There are four major differences between the FRA and the PRA.
First, although the FRA authorizes the Archivist to promulgate guide-
lines and regulations to assist agencies in the development of a records
115. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c) (1991). Section 2203(c) provides:
During this term of office, the President may dispose of those of his Presidential records
that no longer have administrative, historical, informational or evidentiary value if: (1) the
President obtains the views, in writing, of the Archivist concerning the proposed disposal
of such Presidential records; and (2) the Archivist states that he does not intend to take any
action under (e) of this section.
Id.
116. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(e) (1991). Section 2203(e) provides:
The Archivist shall request the advice of the Committee on Rules and Administration and
the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on House Ad-
ministration and the Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representa-
tives with respect to any proposal of Presidential records whenever he considers that: (I)
these particular records may be of special interest to the Congress; or (2) consultation with
the Congress regarding the disposal of these particular records is in the public interest.
Id.
117. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(d) (1991).
118. Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 286.
119. Id. at 282. Although the President must notify the Archivist before disposing of records
and the Archivist may inform Congress of the President's desire to dispose of the records, neither the
Archivist nor Congress holds the authority to veto the President's disposal decision. Rather, the
provision authorizing the Archivist to inform Congress "is solely for notification though Congress
would have its traditional means of voicing objection to particulars in the proposal directly to the
President, or ultimately by passing legislation to block the destruction of certain records." Id.
120. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(0(1) (1991).
121. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(0(3) (1991).
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management system, the PRA lacks an analogous provision.122 Second,
the FRA gives the Archivist the authority to inspect agency records and
to survey agency records management practices, while again, the PRA
lacks such a provision.123 Third, the FRA requires the Archivist to pro-
vide Congress with annual reports on agency recordkeeping policies and
practices while the PRA makes no such requirement.124 Finally, unlike
the FRA, the PRA precludes judicial review of policy choices made by
the President to implement the PRA. 12 5
III. THE NIXON PAPERS: TAKINGS CLAUSE APPLICABILITY TO
PRESIDENTIAL PAPERS
President Nixon left behind approximately forty-two million pages of
White House documents and eight hundred and eighty tape recorded
conversations when he resigned as President of the United States in
1974.126 Since that date, President Nixon has engaged in a long and
rather complex series of court battles regarding ownership and control of
his presidential papers.127
122. Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 290.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. In Armstrong, the D.C. Circuit considered whether the President is regarded as a Federal
agency within the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Id. at 288. The APA definition of the
term "agency" notably does not exclude the President: "each authority of the Government of the
United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but excludes (A)
the Congress; (B) the United States courts; (C) the governments of the territories or possessions of
the United States; and (D) the government of the District of Columbia .. " 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)
(1991). The court found that although the President, unlike Congress and the courts, is not explic-
itly excluded from the APA definition, he is impliedly excluded. Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 289.
The court determined that the textual silence, when read against the backdrop of the legislative
history of the APA and the canons of construction pertinent to statutes that implicate the separation
of powers, demonstrates that Congress did not intend to subject the President to the APA. Id.
Further, the D.C. Circuit found that permitting judicial review of the President's compliance with
the PRA would upset the sophisticated statutory scheme Congress carefully drafted to adequately
balance important competing political and constitutional concerns. Id. at 290. Thus, the court held
that unlike the FRA, the PRA precludes judicial review. Id.
126. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 430.
127. Relevant cases subsequent to President Nixon's resignation which are a part of this complex
litigation history include: Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F.Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1975), dismissed, 437 F.
Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1977) (Nixon's original suit to enforce the terms of the Nixon-Sampson agree-
ment); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (filed while the Sampson
law suit was pending, it challenged the constitutionality of the PRMPA); Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d
427, 430 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (ordered the district court to consider the question involved in Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services before taking further action on the Sampson case).
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A. The Nixon Litigation
Prior to releasing the presidential materials to President Nixon in
1974, President Ford requested an opinion from the U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral regarding the ownership of the materials.'28 In response, the Attor-
ney General determined that President Nixon fully owned the
materials.' 29 After receiving this opinion, the Administrator of the Gen-
eral Services Administration (GSA), Arthur Sampson, executed a deposi-
tory agreement with President Nixon (Nixon-Sampson Agreement)
whereby President Nixon retained title to all materials, but agreed to
deposit them with the GSA in accordance with the FRA. t3° At this
point, the Watergate Special Prosecutor requested a postponement in the
implementation of the Nixon-Sampson Agreement. 3 ' President Nixon
then sued to compel specific performance of the Nixon-Sampson
Agreement. 132
Congress enacted the Presidential Recordings and Materials Act of
1974 (PRMPA) 133 while these actions were pending. The primary con-
128. Spencer, Recent Case, supra note 31, at 373.
129. On September 6, 1974, Attorney General Saxbe issued his formal opinion concluding:
Because the principle of Presidential ownership of White House materials has been ac-
knowledged by all three branches of the Government from the earliest times; because that
principle does not violate any provision of the Constitution or contravene any existing
statute; and because that principle is not inconsistent with adequate protection of the inter-
ests of the United States; I conclude that the papers and materials in question were the
property of Richard M. Nixon when his term of office ended.
43 Op. Atty. Gen. 1, 7 (1974)
130. Appellee's Opening Brief at 11, Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(No. 92-5021). In the Nixon-Sampson Agreement, President Nixon offered to transfer substantially
all presidential materials to Mr. Sampson, Administrator of GSA, for deposit in a government facil-
ity near President Nixon's California residence. The materials were to remain in California until a
permanent presidential archival depository was established with President Nixon's approval. Id. at
11-12. President Nixon stipulated his intent to donate his White House tape recordings effective
September 1, 1979. However, President Nixon indicated on that date the Administrator must de-
stroy certain tapes. President Nixon also stipulated that aceess to all materials, including the tape
recordings, would be limited to President Nixon and others authorized by him to obtain access. Id.
131. Spencer, Recent Case, supra note 31, at 374. Watergate Special Prosecutor, Henry Ruth
informed President Ford that he had a continuing need of the Presidential materials for the success-
ful prosecution of pending criminal cases. Id.
132. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Sampson 591 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
President Nixon's action to enforce the terms of the Nixon-Sampson Agreement was consolidated
with actions by the reporters committee and others attempting to have the materials declared prop-
erty of the United States and to gain access thereto under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
The court held that the PRMPA did not bar processing of the FOIA requests for presidential papers.
Id.
133. Presidential Recordings Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. 93-526, § 1, Title I, §§ 101 to
106, 88 Stat. 1695-1698 (1974) (codified as amended at note to 44 U.S.C. § 2111 (1991)).
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gressional objectives for enacting the PRMPA were to preserve Water-
gate materials for immediate use in judicial proceedings and to disclose
these materials to the public.134 However, in its final form, the bill's cov-
erage extended to Nixon's presidential historical materials beyond the
immediate need of the legislation for pending criminal proceedings.1 35
The PRMPA instructs the administrator of the GSA, and subsequent to
the PRMPA 1984 amendment, 136 the Archivist, to gain complete control
over all of President Nixon's presidential historical material, 137 including
designated tape recordings.138
134. See Note, Government Control of Richard Nixon's Presidential Material, 87 YALE L.J.
1601, 1604 n.16 (1978).
135. Id.
136. Presidential Recordings Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. 93-526, § 1, Title I, §§ 101 to
106, 88 Stat. 1695-1698 (1974) (codified as amended at note to 44 U.S.C. § 2111 (1991)). The 1984
Amendment substituted "Archivist" for "Administrator of General Services." This substitution re-
suited in the Archivist gaining considerably more responsibilities and obligations.
137. PRMPA § 101(b)(3), 44 U.S.C. § 2111 (1991). See also Note, supra note 134, at 1603. The
Act adopts the definition of historical materials found in the Presidential Libraries Act of 1955
which includes anything in the President's possession of "historical or commemorative value" but is
restricted to the period of the Nixon Presidency (January 20, 1969 - August 9, 1974). Id.
138. The relevant section provides:
(a) Notwithstanding any other law or any agreement or understanding made pursuant to
section 2111 of title 44, U.S.C. any Federal employee in possession shall deliver, and the
Archivist of the United States shall receive, obtain, or retain, complete possession and
control of all original tape recordings of conversations which were recorded or caused to be
recorded by any officer or employee of the Federal Government and which-
(1) involve former President Richard M. Nixon or other individuals who, at the time of
the conversation, were employed by the Federal Government;
(2) were recorded in the White House or in the office of the President in the Executive
Office Buildings located in Washington D.C.; Camp David, Maryland; Key Biscayne, Flor-
ida; or San Clemente, California; and
(3) were recorded during the period beginning January 20, 1969 and ending August 9,
1974.
(b)(l) Notwithstanding any other law or any agreement or understanding made pursuant
to section 2111 of title 44 U.S.C., the Archivist shall receive, retain, or make reasonable
efforts to obtain, complete possession and control of all papers, documents, memorandums,
transcripts, and other objects and materials which constitute the Presidential historical
materials of Richard M. Nixon, covering the period beginning January 20, 1969 and end-
ing August 9, 1974.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term 'historical materials' has the meaning given it
by [44 U.S.C. § 2101]. PRMPA § 101, 44 U.S.C. § 2111 (1991).
Since the passage of the PRMPA, the U.S. has retained complete possession and control of Presi-
dent Nixon's materials. Appellant's opening Brief at 12-13, Nixon v. United States. Section 102 of
the Act provides that no one may destroy tape recordings or other presidential materials, except with
the Archivist's permission. PRMPA, § 102, 44 U.S.C. § 2111 (1991). Section 102 also gives Presi-
dent Nixon and his designated agents access to the papers. Id.
Under the PRMPA the Archivist must create and issue regulations necessary to ensure the pro-
tection of presidential materials. PRMPA, § 103, 44 U.S.C. § 2111 (1991). Additionally, the statute
requires the Archivist to submit a report to Congress proposing and explaining regulations that
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In Nixon v. Administrator,139 Nixon sought declaratory and injunctive
relief against enforcement of the PRMPA. The U.S. Supreme Court
found the PRMPA constitutional and rejected all of President Nixon's
constitutional arguments which included separation of powers,' 40 pri-
vacy right, 4 1 equal protection,142 and executive privilege. 43 The Court
held that although President Nixon possessed some First Amendment
rights to his personal papers, simply granting custody of the presidential
grant public access to presidential materials. PRMPA, § 104, 44 U.S.C. § 2111 (1991). Further, the
PRMPA regulations provide for screening of President Nixon's materials to determine which mate-
rial to permanently retain. See Note, supra note 134, at 1604.
Although both the PRMPA and the PRA regulate the creation, destruction and public access of
presidential papers, fundamental differences exist between the two statutes. First, the GSA nar-
rowed the coverage of the PRMPA to exclude President Nixon's vice-presidential papers and
records of private organizations stored within the Executive branch. Id. at 1608. Conversely, the
PRA includes vice-presidential papers in its regulatory realm. See 44 U.S.C. § 2207 (1991). In
addition, the PRMPA expressly provides for judicial review, granting exclusive jurisdiction to the
D.C. District Court in section 105. 44 U.S.C. § 2111 (1991). As previously noted, in Armstrong v.
Bush, the D.C. Appellate Court held that the PRA precluded such judicial review. See supra note
125.
139. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
140. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 433 U.S. at 441. The PRMPA does not violate
separation of powers principles because the executive branch became a party to the regulations of the
PRMPA. This occurred when President Ford signed the PRMPA's provisions into law and when
President Carter's administration urged affirmance of the trial court judgment upholding PRMPA's
constitutionality. Moreover, the PRMPA does not violate the separation of powers doctrine because
the control of the presidential materials remains in the person of the Administrator of the GSA and
the Archivist. Id.
141. Id. at 455. See Nixon v. Freeman, 670 F.2d 346 (1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1035.
PRMPA regulations included the creation of archival centers where members of the public could
listen to copies of certain tape recordings made by the former president. The court found that this
provision did not violate the former president's constitutional privacy right. The regulation directed
archivists to identify and return to the former president private or personal material. The provision
also created a procedure for asserting constitutionally based objections to all public access. The court
found that because there was no broad privacy right regarding the former president's life while in
office, the archival listening center regulation would not result in the public listening to recordings
implicating the former president's privacy rights. Id.
142. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471-72. There is a rational basis for different treatment given to other
former presidents with respect to their papers and treatment afforded President Nixon under the
PRMPA. The validity of the difference in treatment is partially due to the fact that papers of the
former president's predecessors were already deposited in presidential libraries, whereas President
Nixon's papers were not so deposited. The difference is also legitimate because there is an adequate
basis to conclude that the former president might not be a completely reliable custodian of the
presidential materials due to the conditions under which he left the Executive Office. Therefore, the
PRMPA did not deny equal protection to the former president. Id.
143. Id. at 446. Three objectives provided adequate justification for the limited intrusion into
presidential privilege resulting from the provisions of the PRMPA: 1) establishing regular proce-
dures to regulate the preservation of presidential materials for legitimate historical and government
purposes; 2) restoring public confidence in the political process by preserving materials for a full
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papers to the Administrator of the GSA and permitting their archival
screening did not render the statute facially unconstitutional.'" How-
ever, the Court expressly declined to determine whether President Nixon
held legal title to the materials.145 Consequently, the Supreme Court re-
fused to rule on the takings issue in Nixon v. Administrator.'46
After almost two decades of intense litigation, the courts finally ad-
dressed the takings issue in Nixon v. United States47 Upon reviewing
the long and robust history of the presidential ownership of White House
papers, 148 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia determined
that President Nixon held a well-grounded expectation of ownership.
The court found that mutually explicit understandings created a prop-
erty interest through history, custom and usage, and thus President
Nixon possessed a compensable property interest in the materials. "
Consequently, the court determined that the PRMPA constituted a per
se taking of presidential property because it effectively destroyed the
most integral characteristics of ownership. 150 The court concluded that
President Nixon deserves the constitutionally-mandated remedy of just
compensation. 151
The court reaffirmed that although a great public interest may justify a
taking, it does not convert a taking into a mere regulation.'52 In this
case, the court determined the rights President Nixon retained in the
presidential materials were so nominal and fragmented that his original
airing of events leading to Nixon's resignation; and, 3) understanding how those political processes
had operated in order to gauge the necessity for remedial legislation. Id.
See also Kaye, supra note 1, at 525. Congress possesses a similar privilege to the Executive privi-
lege. The express constitutional provisions that determine Congress' right to maintain the confiden-
tiality of its materials are contained in Article I. The publication clause, the immunity from arrest
clause, and the speech and debate clause are the most pertinent. Each of these clauses has, at one
time or another, provided support for congressional claims of privilege over internal materials. Id.
144. 433 U.S. at 465-68.
145. Id. at 439.
146. Id. at 445 n.8. The court saw "no reason to engage in the debate whether [President Nixon]
has legal title to the materials." Id.
147. 978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
148. See supra notes 33-56 and accompanying text.
149. Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1284.
150. Id. at 1287.
151. Id. The Appellate court reversed the district court, 782 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1991) (hold-
ing the PRMPA did not constitute a taking of President Nixon's White House material), and re-
manded to set compensation. Id.
152. Id. at 1284-87.
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property interest was effectively decimated.' 3
The court reasoned that a per se taking may occur even when a former
property owner retains some rights of access.' 54 The test the court ap-
plied in determining a per se taking is whether the former owner's access
rights preserved the essential economic use of the surrendered prop-
erty. 55 The court indicated that, under the PRMPA, President Nixon
maintained the right to utilize his papers, presumably for his own autobi-
ographical and historical work and research." 6 However, due to the
PRMPA, President Nixon lost any bargaining power he had regarding
his presidential papers." 7 Significantly, President Nixon lost the power
to freely dispose of his papers.' 58
Most importantly, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
found that the PRMPA completely abolished President Nixon's right to
unilaterally exclude others from the materials. 15 9 The court determined
that the PRMPA deprives President Nixon of this property right because
he had lost the ability to prevent any person from viewing or using his
presidential papers.' 60 The court indicated that the privileges conferred
to President Nixon regarding the presidential materials were not substan-
tively different from the privileges enjoyed by anyone else.' 6'
The court resolved that the PRMPA severely restricted President
Nixon's property rights in his presidential papers.' 62 Thus, the court
concluded that the PRMPA resulted in a per se taking and President
Nixon is entitled to just compensation.' 63
153. Id. The court determined that the rights granted to Nixon were so minute that they cannot
be equated with property. Thus, the PRMPA constitutes a per se taking of Nixon's property. Id.
154. Id. at 1285. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 (taking when owner was prohibited from any
economic use of the land); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987) (tak-
ing when owner required to grant public easement across property in exchange for building permit).
155. 978 F.2d at 1286. The court found that "the right of access retained by Mr. Nixon is but a
thin reed among those associated with the ownership of presidential papers." Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. The court confirmed that "the right to exclude other individuals from private property
is perhaps the quintessential property right. Without this right, one's property interest becomes very
tenuous since it is then subject to the whim of others-an interest more akin to a license than to
ownership." Id. (citations omitted).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1287.
163. Id.
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B. Impact of Nixon on the Congressional and Judicial Branches
As noted above, individual members of the congressional and judicial
branches of the federal government also have a personal property interest
in their materials."M Both branches have a long and unbroken history of
private ownership of their papers.1 65 Consequently, this history creates
distinct property rights both for Members of Congress and federal judges
in their congressional and judicial materials, respectively.166
Realistically, the only way the public can gain access to these histori-
cally significant documents is through congressionally promulgated legis-
lation. 167 Public pressure is paramount in this process. Only intense and
powerful constituent influence will result in public ownership of these
papers and consequently full public access. 168  However, such public
pressure is possible and indeed likely due to the massive publicity of the
Armstrong case. Moreover, this pressure will mount because enraged
American taxpayers may soon pay a hefty price to President Nixon, a
man whose administration's negative effects still mar American
politics. 169
Finally, the primary policy reason for the pubic gaining full access to
congressional and judicial materials is that fundamentally, information is
a crucial societal resource. 170 The First Amendment protects freedom of
speech and the rights of the American people to petition government. 171
Furthermore, Americans have a lengthy legal tradition regarding the
government's responsibility to ensure the flow of information.172
The well-reasoned takings analysis in Nixon can be easily expanded to
164. See supra notes 60-78 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 60-78 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 21 and accompanying text..
167. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 5, 8. See also LOUIs W. KOENIG, THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 75 (1975). ("The
Nixon pardon... was a stark contradiction of the democratic ideal of equal justice.")
170. See Miller & Cox, supra note 60, at 216. ("Open information engenders healthy debate and
criticism. Recognition of a right to know what government is doing through free access to govern-
ment information can be traced back to the formative years of the American Republic.") See also
MCCLURE, ET AL., supra note 68, at 77.
171. MCCLURE, ET AL., supra note 68, at 116 ("The Constitution establishes the government's
function as an information collector and disseminator ... ").
172. Id. See also Miller & Sasri, supra note 75, at 822 ("In a polity that considers itself demo-
cratic, secrecy should be the exception and openness disclosure the rule. Only if it can be demon-
strated that there is a pressing public need for secrecy-as in certain national security matters-
should [secrecy] be permitted ... ").
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include the congressional and judicial branches of the federal govern-
ment. Like the President, Members of Congress as well as federal judges
possess a deep, historically-rooted property interest in their valuable
materials.173 However, currently, no statute provides for public owner-
ship or access to congressional or judicial materials. Therefore, under
the present system, the only means of obtaining access to these materials
would be through a congressional statute similar to the PRMPA. 1'74
If Congress enacts prospective legislation within the near future, it can
avoid the takings issue presented by the promulgation of the PRMPA.17 1
However, if Congress postpones enacting the necessary legislation until
an immediate need for the papers arises, such legislation would undoubt-
edly result in a per se taking of an individual congressional member's or
federal judges's private property. 176 Consequently, the Constitution
would require just compensation. The final result would involve the
American taxpayer forfeiting millions of dollars to compensate a perhaps
scandalous constitutional officeholder. 177
IV. PROPOSAL FOR EXPANDING LEGISLATION REGULATING THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO THE CONGRESSIONAL AND
JUDICIAL BRANCHES
Congress has taken a step in the right direction in enacting legislation
providing for ownership and control of the executive branch materials. 178
However, in response to the Nixon case, Congress should take additional
steps toward better public information by expanding legislation currently
governing the papers of the executive branch to the congressional and
judicial branches. 179
Like the FRA, the PRA and the PRMPA, legislation governing the
congressional and judicial branches should establish a comprehensive
management system including provisions for the creation and disposal of
records.180 However, of the three statutes governing papers of the execu-
173. See supra notes 60-78 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 126-46 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 29.
177. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 79-121 and accompanying text.
179. See Spencer, Recent Case, supra note 31, at 386. The author indicated that legislation of
the type proposed in this Note would constitute a positive result from Nixon v. Administrator, 433
U.S. 425 (1977).
180. See supra note 81.
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tive branch, legislation governing congressional and judicial material
should be most like the PRA in order to avoid Fifth Amendment takings.
The PRA explicitly provides for complete governmental ownership of
the presidential materials. If the government owns the materials out-
right, no legitimate takings claim can arise. However, Congress must
enact prospective legislation to govern itself and the courts in order to
remove the expectation of property ownership, and thus withstand indi-
vidual takings claims.
Additionally, like the PRA, legislation governing other branches of
government should explicitly preclude judicial review."8 This new legis-
lation should not require annual congressional reports or Archivist regu-
lations.18 2 Annual congressional reports, Archivist regulations and
judicial review would not provide effective regulating devices for congres-
sional and legislative papers. A better system of checks and balances was
already implicitly established by the PRA. I 3
The PRA establishes executive, legislative, and judicial checks and bal-
ances. First, in accordance with the PRA, the President appoints the
Archivist who plays a key role in management and disposal of presiden-
tial papers.1 4 This executive check should remain equally as prominent
for the regulation of congressional and judicial papers. Second, the PRA
also establishes a congressional check through the Archivist. ' 5 The Ar-
chivist may inform Congress if he believes material the President wants
to dispose of is historically important.18 6 The PRA allows Congress
sixty days to enact legislation preventing disposal of the records in ques-
tion.18 7 Proposed congressional and judicial legislation should adopt this
congressional checking system. Congress can check the other two
branches in this fashion rather than requiring administratively burden-
some annual congressional reports by the executive and judicial
branches. 8 8 Finally, under the PRA, the judiciary maintains a check
through the use of its subpoena power rather than direct judicial re-
181. See supra notes 125, 138 and accompanying text. Conversely, both the FRA and the
PRMPA provide for judicial review.
182. See supra notes 86-87, 138. Both the FRA and the PRMPA provide for congressional
reports and Archivist regulations.
183. See supra notes 101-21 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 87, 138 and accompanying text.
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view. 189 This check permits the judiciary to access historically relevant
information in the event of a Watergate-type scandal.
Further, the same in-office freedom that applies to the Chief Executive
under the PRA should apply equally to the congressional and judicial
branches. Under the PRA, while the President is in office, he possesses
virtually complete control over his papers.19 This control is subject only
to the checks of the other two branches which are essentially reserved for
drastic or emergency situations.191
A fairly large appropriation of funds must accompany this legislation.
However, in the wake of Nixon, the American public will likely acqui-
esce to an appropriation for the meaningful and legitimate purpose of
increased public information. 192 Also, proposed legislation can reduce
overall costs by departing from the PRA's provision regarding the ability
of Presidents to restrict public access to their materials upon leaving
office. 193
Like the FRA, statutes governing the management of congressional
and judicial papers should not contain provisions allowing Members of
Congress and judges to limit access to their individual materials after
leaving office. The administrative costs of archival management for one
individual, the President, are significantly less than the same costs for
hundreds of congressional members and federal judges. Furthermore,
the need for restricted access is not as prevalent because no elaborate
library system has been instituted for individual members of Congress
and the Judiciary. 194
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has demonstrated that congressional members and federal
judges hold the same property interest in their individual papers that
Presidents held prior to the Nixon litigation and passage of the PRMPA.
Therefore, a Fifth Amendment taking will result if the government devel-
ops a need to seize these congressional or judicial materials through legis-
lation. Both public policy and a desire to avoid a takings situation
similar to the Nixon case should encourage Congress to promulgate nec-
189. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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essary prospective legislation to regulate its own materials as well as
those of the judicial branch. Further, due to the excessive negative pub-
licity of Nixon, the American taxpayer should strongly support this mea-
sure. Taxpayers must begrudgingly pay President Nixon today.
However, through pressure on their elected officials, the public should
secure a favorable result for the future.
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